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An Affair of State: The Investigation, Impeachment, and Trial of
President Clinton. Richard A. Posner. Harvard University Press,
1999. Pp vii, 266.
For a long time, I have suspected that there is more than one
Richard Posner. There is the extremely prolific scholar, Richard Pos-
ner, who has written over thirty books' and more than a hundred arti-
cles in such fields as torts, constitutional law, criminal law and proce-
dure, federal jurisdiction, moral and political philosophy, antitrust,
economics, property, and contracts. There is also Richard Posner the
judicial biographer and the man who founded an antitrust counseling
firm. There is Richard Posner the judge who has been on the federal
court of appeals for almost two decades, is reputed to be one of the
most prolific and fastest judges in the nation, and has risen to the chief
judgeship of his circuit. And there is the Richard Posner who writes
about the intersection of law and such varied areas as sex, aging, lit-
erature, and AIDS.
In his new book, An Affair of State: The Investigation, Impeach-
ment, and Trial of President Clinton, virtually all of these dimensions
of Richard Posner are present. It is a wonderfully elegant and pro-
vocative book and is sure to be among the most distinguished in the
anticipated long line of commentaries on President Clinton's im-
peachment ordeal.2 In characteristic fashion, Posner pulls no punches,
t Professor of Law, The College of William and Mary. I want to thank Susan Low Bloch,
John Duffy, Deborah Gerhardt, Neal Kudmar Katyal, Neil Kinkopf, and Alan Meese for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts.
I am most grateful for the graciousness and generosity of Judge Posner's chambers, which
gave me a list of his many publications. The numbers of books and articles cited in this Review
are based on this list.
2 Judge Posner began the book in October 1998 and finished it four days after the close of
the impeachment trial (p 4). Other recent books that analyze the President's impeachment pro-
ceedings include Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel, Warp Speed:America in the Age of Mixed Me-
dia (Century Foundation 1999); Elizabeth Drew, The Corruption of American Politics: What Went
Wrong and Why (Birch Lane 1999); and Bob Woodward, Shadow: Five Presidents and the Legacy
of Watergate (Simon & Schuster 1999). See also Laurence H. Tribe, 1 American Constitutional
Law 152-202 (Foundation 3d ed 2000). For a forthcoming book with substantial discussion of
this subject, see Michael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process: A Constitutional and
HistoricalAnalysis (Chicago 2d ed 2000).
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concluding that the impeachment and trial of Bill Clinton is a "story
of the failure of the judiciary, the political establishment, the Congress,
the legal profession, and the academic community to cope with a
novel challenge" (p 5). In telling this story, Posner examines almost
every conceivable evidentiary, procedural, moral, criminal law, social,
cultural, and constitutional issue raised in the proceedings.
The book's great strength is its extraordinarily rich, multidimen-
sional perspective on the Clinton impeachment proceedings. This per-
spective reveals some aspects of the impeachment process that have
been inadequately captured or overlooked in other commentaries,
such as the difficulties posed by the vagueness of the constitutional
standard of impeachment for principled decisionmaking in an im-
peachment trial. Moreover, the analysis features an insightful depic-
tion of the Clinton impeachment proceedings as cause and effect of
modem American culture wars (pp 199-216), and a new dimension of
Richard Posner as military strategist, who draws an intriguing analogy
between the Clinton impeachment proceedings and war, based on the
work of the great military historian and tactician Carl von Clausewitz
(pp 248-61).
The purpose of this Review is to assess both Richard Posner's ba-
sic judgment that various institutions failed to meet the challenges
posed by Clinton's legal and impeachment troubles, and the analysis
by which he reached that judgment. This Review suggests that Pos-
ner's dismal assessments of institutional performances throughout
President Clinton's impeachment ordeal lack sufficient support.
There are significant portions of the records of the Clinton and past
impeachment proceedings that Posner fails to consider in formulating
his judgments. These failures also undercut his claim that his preferred
means of resolving impeachment issues-pragmatism or the balancing
of the "probable consequences" (p 183) of actual or likely decisions-
is superior to "soft subjects" (such as history and law), which are
"permeable to political disagreements" and which differ from the
hard sciences in which "agreement on the methods for resolving dis-
agreement enables consensus to be forged despite the differing politi-
cal agendas of the practitioners" (p 240). Posner fails to establish con-
vincingly that his analysis of the President's acquittal is any more im-
mune to abuse than other approaches.
I See Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton 1976) (Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds
and trans).
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I. JUDGE POSNER'S LESSONS
The central theme of An Affair of State is the failure of various
institutions to rise to the challenges posed by President Clinton's legal
and impeachment troubles. The failed institutions include Congress,
the Supreme Court, the legal system as well as the legal profession, the
presidency, and the academic community. A secondary theme is that
these institutions should be assessed based on the likely consequences
and the actual ramifications of the decisions they did make.
One source of the problem, according to Posner, is "post-electoral
politics," in which political combat transpires through "revelation, in-
vestigation, and prosecution" instead of electoral competition (pp
115-16).' He blames post-electoral politics for generally providing "a
climate favorable to political impeachment," as well as for particular
events in the impeachment proceedings, such as the outing of adulter-
ous Republicans and the attempts to "'pay back' the Democrats for
forcing Nixon from office" (p 116).
Posner also criticizes Congress for not following procedures that
appear fair. For example, the House did not adopt rules before
receiving the Starr Report (p 93), and the Senate never imposed a gag
rule or articulated rules regarding a burden of proof or evidence (pp
120-24, 126, 128). These omissions "underscor[ed] the failure of the
impeachment proceeding to meet minimal standards of legal justice"
(p 94).
The Supreme Court's major error was "its failure to engage with
the Realpolitik considerations" implicated in the case, including "how
the independent counsel law had worked in the past" or "how it might
work in the future," particularly in a case in which the President was a
party (p 223) and the explosive subject was sex (pp 215, 225-30). The
majority opinions in Morrison v Olson6 and Clinton v Jones7 were ex-
cessively "legalistic" (p 223). Instead, the Court should have narrowly
interpreted precedent and considered alternatives such as staying
Jones's proceedings until Clinton's term expired, or allowing Clinton
to be deposed only if absolutely necessary (p 229). As a solution, Pos-
ner recommends appointing justices with more political experience (p
229).
. See, for example, p 174 ("The lack of a definite standard of Presidential impeachability
makes it natural to focus on the consequences of impeaching and convicting. Let us try to com-
pare the likely bad consequences with the likely [good] consequences of alternative courses of
action.").
' Posner is quoting Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin Shefter, Politics by Other Means: The
Declining Importance of Elections in America 26 (Basic Books 1990).
487 US 654 (1988).
520 US 681 (1997).
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Clinton also deserves blame for violating the executive and ex-
emplary moral duties of his office (pp 133-69). The former are his ex-
ecutive and administrative duties, which can only be executed success-
fully by someone with credibility (pp 148, 152). The latter include his
duties to serve as a role model, to preserve the dignity of his office,
and to avoid scandal (p 153). Clinton's extramarital sexual activities
and attempts to cover up these activities "may have succeeded ... un-
wittingly in destroying the mystique of the Presidency once and for
all" (p 167). In fact, Posner argues that Clinton's violation of the ex-
emplary duties of his office constitutes "the most powerful case for
impeachment and conviction" (pp 157-58).$
The legal profession also failed to perform admirably throughout
the President's legal proceedings. First, leaders of the bar, law school
deans, and prominent law professors failed "in general to emphasize
the importance of the rule of law in general and of telling the truth in
depositions and in testimony before a grand jury, in particular, and to
point out that Clinton is a member of the Arkansas bar and that the
conduct in which he engaged would ordinarily result in disbarment"
(p 240). Moreover, academicians' advocacy in the Clinton proceedings
revealed the failure of their respective disciplines to posit consensus-
building solutions to moral dilemmas (pp 230-40). This failure is
symptomatic of a "soft" field (such as history or law) in contrast to a
"hard" field (such as physics) in which theorists reason to "divergent
conclusions from shared premises" (p 240).
. Judge Posner is also particularly harsh on the President's per-
sonal lawyers, who grounded their defense in the Senate trial on
"quibbling, hair-splitting equivocation, brazen denial of the obvious,
truncated quotation and quotation out of context, and
mischaracterization of the law" (p 242). The Independent Counsel and
the House Judiciary Committee's members and staff were not much
better; they committed "errors of tact, taste, and public relations" (p
246) in leaking material that was primarily designed to embarrass the
President (if not to harass him into leaving office) and engaging in
"hardball" tactics by effectively threatening Monica Lewinsky and her
mother with prison (p 76).
Judge Posner concludes that not all of the fallout from the Presi-
dent's legal and impeachment troubles was negative. Despite these
numerous failures, for example, the public is somewhat more informed
about law, ethics, and politics, at least for the short term (p 14). Be-
cause the impeachment drama "reveal[ed] that a higher percentage of
. Judge Posner also finds President Clinton guilty of various breaches of private morality (p
148).
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politicians have skeletons in their closet" (p 263) than previously be-
lieved, elections might become more focused on substantive issues
rather than on scandal (p 263). Additionally, the impeachment "dem-
onstrated the resilience of the American government. For despite
everything, government ticked along in its usual way through thirteen
months of so-called crisis" (p 263).
II. JUDGING THE SUPREME COURT
It makes sense to begin with an analysis of Judge Posner's cri-
tique of the Supreme Court, for that is the institution that set every-
thing in motion. Posner overestimates the Supreme Court's responsi-
bility and underestimates the fault of District Court Judge Susan
Webber Wright and President Clinton for the fallout from Morrison
and Jones. His critique of the Court rests on an unfounded link be-
tween limitations in the experiences of the justices and flaws in the
Court's opinions. Lastly, he never explains how his preferred resolu-
tions of Morrison and Jones can be squared with relevant precedent.
A. Grading the Court
Posner identifies Morrison and Jones as forces that propelled the
impeachment proceedings and associated events, but he neglects to as-
sess fully the contributions of intervening characters, namely, Presi-
dent Clinton and District Judge Wright. Judge Posner does not men-
tion that in the seven months between Clinton's civil deposition in the
Jones case and his grand jury appearance, the President reputedly had
been warned more than once to come clean.9 Consequently, it is only
fair that he be held responsible for most of the fallout from his failure
to heed this counsel. '° Nor would it have been unreasonable for the
Court to have assumed that a President would testify truthfully in a
legal proceeding. Moreover, the Supreme Court based its ruling in
Jones on the expectation that the District Judge would manage dis-
covery to avoid undue interference with the President's duties." Yet,
12as Judge Posner recognizes, the District Judge failed to do so.
I See, for example, Bill Nichols and Susan Page, Advisers Used the Media to Push for Ad-
mission, USA Today 1A (Aug 17,1998); Jim Wolf Hatch Warns Clinton on Testimony; Defiance
Is Termed Reason to Impeach, Washington Post A4 (July 13,1998).
" Posner suggests that the President's choice to lie at that time rather than refuse to answer
questions "was probably his single biggest mistake in the whole mess" (p 161 n 56).
Jones, 520 US at 702,707.
At the very least, Judge Wright could have, as Judge Posner suggests (p 228), dismissed the
case without discovery once she had decided that Paula Jones had not suffered a sufficiently se-
rious injury to support a cause of action for sexual harassment. She also could have disallowed
questioning of the President about Monica Lewinsky (p 210); or she could have encouraged or
2000]
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B. Judge Posner's Critique of the Justices
Posner suggests the Justices' political inexperience (p 228) helps
to explain the Court's holding in Jones, but none of the Justices would
be where they are had they not been unusually politically astute.
Moreover, Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, and Breyer have previously
held significant political positions in the federal government,3 while
Souter (as a New Hampshire attorney general) and O'Connor (as
majority leader of the Arizona state senate) were not political neo-
phytes.
Even if the Justices were politically unsophisticated, Posner's rec-
ommended solution, that the next Justice appointed have substantial
political experience (p 229), would not produce a different outcome.
Jones was a unanimous holding, and only Scalia dissented in Morri-
son. Assuming that the hypothetical justice disagreed with these
majorities, he or she probably would not be able to garner enough
votes to change any relevant outcomes."
In addition, Judge Posner's criticism of Chief Justice Rehnquist is
unduly harsh. He chides the Chief Justice for presiding over the im-
peachment trial in the same yellow-striped robes that he wears on the
bench. The robes "drew a good deal of comment, all duly noting their
comic opera origins" (p 168).6 In Judge Posner's opinion, "the appear-
ance [Rehnquist] presented makes it difficult to believe that the
American people any longer expect their officials to be more digni-
fied, aloof, and impressive than themselves" (p 168). There is no evi-
dence to indicate that the Chief Justice's attire had the effect sug-
gested by Judge Posner or that most people appreciated its inspiration
or irony. In fact, these inferences do not comport with the actual trial
scene. Anyone who watched or followed the trial in its entirety could
not help but notice the extraordinary respect that the Senate gave to
the Chief Justice. A dramatic example of this respect was that no sena-
ordered Jones's lawyers to ask more direct questions of the President (p 48).
Both Rehnquist and Scalia headed the prestigious Office of Legal Counsel in the Justice
Department (a confirmable position), Thomas served as assistant secretary for civil rights at the
Department of Education and as chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(both confirmable offices), and Breyer served as chief counsel to the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee.
487 US at 697.
Breyer, who is known for his collegiality and persuasive skills, did not get a single justice to
join his separate concurrence in Jones, 520 US at 710.
Judge Posner explains that the robes were "inspired by the costume worn by the Lord
.Chancellor in a production that Rehnquist had seen of Gilbert and Sullivan's operetta lolanthe"
(p 168).
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tor ever challenged nor did the Senate overturn a single ruling made
by Chief Justice Rehnquist during the trial.
7
C. The Relevance of Precedent
Though Posner chides the Court for paying too much attention to
history and precedent (p 225), a justice cannot casually ignore prece-
dent, and precedent largely compelled the outcome in Jones. As Jus-
tice Stevens noted, the Court in United States v Nixon 8 and Chief Jus-
tice Marshall in United States v Burr ' held that "the President is sub-
ject to judicial process in appropriate circumstances."' Justice Stevens
noted further that sitting presidents, including Monroe, Nixon, Ford,
and Clinton, have provided court-ordered testimony and evidence so
frequently that it has become commonplace.2 1 If there is no normative
principle supporting a president's use of his office as a shield to block
legal process in a case challenging his actions as president, then it is
hard to see why there should be one in a case challenging unofficial
conduct. The fact that the subject matter of Jones involved sex does
not constitute a justifiable basis for distinguishing it from these other
precedents or for adopting a special constitutional rule. It is primarily
relevant as a basis for a trial judge to maintain tight control over dis-
covery.
III. JUDGING THE PRESIDENCY
No analysis of Clinton's impeachment could be complete with-
out evaluating the impact of Clinton's misconduct on the presidency.
Posner provides an extensive analysis of Clinton's various breaches of
private and public morality, but his discussion of how Clinton's im-
" Such deference sharply contrasts with the experience of Chief Justice Chase, who had sev-
eral rulings disputed and at least two overturned by the Senate in Johnson's impeachment trial.
See John Niven, Salmon P Chase: A Biography 422 (Oxford 1995) (describing how the Senate
overrode Chase's procedural rule on how Senators could overturn his evidentiary rulings); Gene
Smith, High Crimes & Misdemeanors: The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson 263 (Wil-
liam Morrow 1977) (describing how the Senate overturned Chase's ruling that the defense could
call a Cabinet minister to testify).
" 418 US 683 (1974) (holding that President Nixon must comply with subpoena duces tecum
and produce tapes).
" 25 F Cases 30 (C C D Va 1807) (holding that President Jefferson must comply with sub-
poena duces tecum and produce a letter).
Jones, 520 US at 703-04.
Id at 704-05. Stevens here refers to President Monroe responding to written interrogato-
ries, citing Ronald D. Rotunda, Presidents and Ex-Presidents as Witnesses: A Brief Historical
Footnote, 1975 U Ill L F 1, 5-6; President Nixon producing tapes as ordered by the Court in
United States v Nixon, 418 US 683 (1974); President Ford being deposed for United States v
Fromme, 405 F Supp 578 (E D Cal 1975); and President Clinton testifying, on videotape, for
United States v McDougal, 934 F Supp 296 (E D Ark 1996).
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peachment will affect the presidency is unnecessarily brief, and he too
hastily concludes that presidents and judges should be subject to dif-
ferent standards.
A. Clinton's Acquittal as Strengthening the Presidency
One significant issue posed by Clinton's impeachment proceed-
ings is whether his acquittal will weaken or strengthen the presidency.
After assessing the different possible effects of Clinton's acquittal on
the presidency, Judge Posner concludes, "It is sheer speculation that
Clinton's impeachment and its sequelae will bring about a dangerous
weakening of the presidency" (p 179). Indeed, the impeachment is
likely to strengthen the presidency.
One way to assess the impact on the presidency is to examine
how the institution that conducted the proceedings-Congress-will
likely view their significance. It is typical for members of Congress to
try to legitimize the outcome of an impeachment trial by reconciling it
with the outcomes of past proceedings. This reconciliation is likely to
work to the advantage of the presidency.
For example, precedent suggests that Congress will recognize a
presidential zone of privacy, so that a president's private life is largely
immune to scrutiny in the federal impeachment process. Richard
Nixon beyond doubt would have been impeached and removed for his
abuses of uniquely presidential trusts, which had a public dimension,
but not his income tax fraud, which was purely private." Similarly,
most senators who voted to acquit President Clinton explained that
they did not perceive his misconduct as having a sufficiently public
dimension or injury to warrant his removal from office.2 The former
decision, coupled with Clinton's acquittal, likely signals that there is a
See Impeachment Inquiry: William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, Pres-
entation on Behalf of the President, before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong,
2d Sess 125,131-32,153 (GPO 1998) (statements of Robert Drinan (D-MA) and Wayne Owens
(D-UT), members of the House Judiciary Committee during Nixon's impeachment proceedings,
noting that President Nixon's tax evasion was not impeachable because it was personal rather
than official misconduct).
Of the thirty-eight senators who published statements on their reasons for voting not
guilty on both articles, more than half-twenty-six-explained that they did not regard the mis-
conduct alleged in either article of impeachment approved by the House as an impeachable of-
fense. See the statements of Senators Akaka, 145 Cong Rec S 1576-78 (Feb 12,1999); Biden, id at
1476-81; Boxer, id at 1511-12; Breaux, id at 1500-01; Bryan, id at 1608-10; Cleland, id at 1524;
Collins, id at 1568-69; Dorgan, id at 1618-20; Durbin, id at 1530-32; Graham, id at 1560-61;
Hollings, id at 1627-28; Jeffords, id at 1594-97; Johnson, id at 1474; Kennedy, id at 1566-68; Kerry,
id at 1620-22; Kohl, id at 1547-48; Leahy, id at 1587-88; Levin, id at 1543-46; Lieberman, id at
1600-O5; Lincoln, id at 1625-26; Mikulski, id at 1498-99; Moynihan, id at 1559-60; Reid, id at
1574-75; Sarbanes, id at 1502-04; Snowe, id at 1546-47,1669-71; and Wellstone, id at 1597-98.
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zone of a president's private life that will be treated as largely off lim-
its in the federal impeachment process.
Congress will also likely recognize that any impeachment inquiry
into a popular president or an inquiry without strong public support
must be kept very short. When faced with an investigation that might
not uncover serious misconduct (insofar as the public is concerned)
for some time, future congresses might think twice before engaging in
a prolonged investigation of a president's misconduct, for fear that it
might alienate the public. Consequently, it is possible that impeach-
ment will be effective only for the kinds of misconduct that can galva-
nize the public to set aside its approval of a president's performance
to support resignation or formal removal. A future Congress might
support removal only if it has direct evidence of very serious wrong-
doing and unambiguous consensus (in Congress and among the pub-
lic) on the gravity of such wrongdoing.2
Finally, independent of whatever reconciliation Congress may
reach, Clinton's acquittal will likely be construed as casting doubt
upon the House's judgment to impeach the President. This may help
wash away any deleterious effects the impeachment might have had
on the presidency.2' The most notorious acquittals in the nineteenth
' Whereas President Clinton's acquittal might make it more difficult for Congress to use
impeachment against a popular president, it does underscore the greater vulnerability to im-
peachment and removal of those officials who lack a president's resources (such as recourse to
the bully pulpit) or popularity. While Judge Posner does not discuss the plight of such officials, it
is hardly inconceivable that an unpopular president such as Andrew Johnson might meet a dif-
ferent fate in an age in which the media constantly applies pressure to investigate a president's
misconduct (or actions that have made him unpopular) and in which daily polls can dramatize a
loss of popularity and increase in support for removal. In these circumstances, removal or resig-
nation might be extremely likely. To date, the only instance like this occurred during the final
days of Richard Nixon's presidency, when the public, for the first and only time during the Wa-
tergate investigation, expressed support for the President's ouster based on information revealed
in the Watergate tapes. See Stanley I. Kutier, The Wars of Watergate 531-32 (Knopf 1990).
Though not discussed by Judge Posner, the dynamic is likely to be even more problematc for a
federal judge, including a Supreme Court justice, whose hearings are not likely to get anything
near the widespread media coverage that President Clinton's proceedings received, nor the out-
pouring of public support (or the public's opposition to the prolongation of hearings). In the ab-
sence of these factors, a federal judge or other low-profile official simply lacks the resources
available to a president (particularly a popular one) in defending against political retaliation in
the form of an impeachment.
Also, once out of office, President Johnson never stopped trying to achieve vindication-
something he thought he had done near the end of his life when the Tennessee state legislature
named him as one of its two U.S. senators. It is equally likely that as long as he remains president
Bill Clinton will not stop trying to rewrite his legacy. While it is doubtful that the Republican-led
Congress would ever let him achieve the vindication that he craves, it is certain that Clinton is in-
tensely interested in doing whatever he can to ensure that the opening line of his obituary does
not mention that he was the second president ever to have been impeached. Some believe, for
instance, that Clinton's intense activity in foreign affairs subsequent to acquittal is motivated in
part by a personal rather than a purely institutional or partisan desire to leave a positive legacy.
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century, namely those of President Johnson and Justice Chase, have
each had the effect of dissuading subsequent congresses from initiat-
ing impeachments based on similar misconduct. The Clinton acquittal
could be construed by subsequent congresses as rejecting the House's
judgment on the impeachability of the President's misconduct.
First, the vote to impeach the President was (as it had been in
Chase's and Johnson's cases) largely cast along party lines (p 111), and
there is a widespread perception that the proceedings generally were
conducted and resolved largely on partisan grounds.2 Moreover, most
people (including most members of Congress) largely agree about the
underlying facts in President Clinton's case; they disagree primarily
over the legal significance of those facts. Subsequent congresses can
reasonably conclude that if such misconduct did not merit a convic-
tion in President Clinton's case, it would be unfair or inconsistent to
allow similar misbehavior to support a conviction.
B. The Standards for Impeaching Presidents and Judges
Perhaps the most divisive constitutional issue in the Clinton im-
peachment proceedings was whether there are different constitutional
standards for impeaching presidents and judges. This issue arose be-
cause one federal judge (Harry Claiborne) had been impeached and
removed from office for having engaged in private misconduct unre-
lated to his office (tax evasion), while two others had been impeached
and removed from office for having committed offenses like those
with which the President was charged (Walter Nixon for making false
statements to a grand jury and Alcee Hastings for pejury and brib-
ery)." If the standards were the same for impeaching presidents and
judges, the case for President Clinton's removal would have been
stronger.
Posner provides three reasons why judges and presidents should
be subject to different impeachment standards (pp 103-04). The first,
that a presidential impeachment is more likely to destabilize the ex-
ecutive branch than a judicial impeachment would the judicial branch
(p 103), is hard to reconcile with some of his other conclusions. Posner
See Poll Update ABC Poll: 71% Say Impeach Vote Based on Partisan Politics, 10 Am Pol
Network 9 (Feb 16,1999); ABC Nightline Poll, 1999 WL 6416273 (Feb 8,1999) (indicating that
74 percent of Americans expected senators not to vote their consciences but rather to vote on
the basis of partisan politics).
Inexplicably, Judge Posner mistakes these facts. He states that "[o]ne judge, Walter Nixon,
was impeached and convicted, in 1989, for pejury before a grand jury" (p 103 n 23). In fact, the
House impeached and the Senate convicted Nixon for making false statements to a grand jury,
which is not the same thing as perjury. It lacks the element of materiality, a prerequisite for
proving perjury.
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repeatedly observes that the President's impeachment proceedings
did not come anywhere close to paralyzing the executive branch (pp
175,263-64). For most of their duration the impeachment proceedings
did not even deflect the President from doing his job (p 149), and, to
the extent they did so, the ensuing paralysis was no different than (and
might have been largely attributable to) the paralysis that inevitably
results from the combination of a Republican Congress and a lame
duck Democratic president (p 175).'s
The second argument given by Posner is that partisan politics are
more likely to play a larger role in the impeachment of an elected of-
ficial, such as a president, than in the impeachment of a judge (p 104).
This argument ignores, however, the radically different resources
available to presidents and judges for combating impeachment.
Clinton's impeachment proceedings dramatically illustrate how presi-
dents can rally political parties, interest groups, academics, and, per-
haps most important, the American people. As Posner notes, presi-
dents can even exact special advantages for themselves, such as having
their lawyers present while questioned before a grand jury, in the com-
fort of the White House (p 152). Such power argues against a presi-
dent's need for a higher impeachment threshold. Indeed, federal
judges who lack such resources might need an impeachment threshold
at least as high as a president's to protect their otherwise fragile ten-
29
ure.
Moreover, judges, though unelected, can be victims of politically
charged reprisals. Consider the case of Judge Harold Baer. After
Judge Baer granted a motion to suppress based on his finding that
federal agents had conducted an illegal search, Bob Dole, then the
Republican candidate for president, threatened Baer with impeach-
ment while President Clinton, who had appointed Baer, indicated
that he was considering whether to ask Baer to resign.2 Though sev-
eral Second Circuit judges denounced the threatened impeachment as
Moreover, Judge Posner stresses that most work in the government is done by subordi-
nates rather than the President (p 175).
Also, the fact that the electoral process serves as a check against executive abuse of power
is not a strong argument for treating presidents differently from judges. The problem with the
argument is that there is no electoral check against a second-term president's misconduct. It is
telling that the impeachment efforts undertaken against Presidents Nixon and Clinton arose in
their second terms when neither was subject any longer to being held accountable in an election.
Under such circumstances, it is pointless to consider the electoral process as a check against
abuse of power. Its primary relevance then has to do with the extent to which the public might
have ratified the President's misconduct in an intervening election.
United States v Bayless, 913 F Supp 232 (S D NY 1996).
Don van Natta, Jr.,Judges Defend a Colleague from Attacks, NY Times B1 (Mar 29,1996).
Alison Mitcheli, Clinton Pressing Judge to Relent, NY Times Al (Mar 22,1996).
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a violation of his constitutionally protected independence," Baer re-
versed himselfC giving rise to the suspicion that the external pressures
affected his decisionmaking.
Posner's third argument for holding judges and presidents to dif-
ferent standards is that judges, but not presidents, have a duty to sym-
bolize and personify the law (p 104). Such a difference of duty, how-
ever, does not signify that the meaning of "high Crimes and Misde-
meanors"35 depends on whether a judge or president is being im-
peached, as Posner claims (p 104). Instead, the constitutional standard
of impeachment could be the same, with the difference in duty shap-
ing the circumstances and context in which the uniform standard is
applied6
There are other arguments that cut against applying different
standards for presidential and judicial impeachments that Judge Pos-
ner does not address. One is that the assertion is counter-historical. It
conflicts with the Founders' obvious intention to adopt the phrase
"during good Behavior" to distinguish judicial tenure (life) from the
tenure of elected officials (such as the President) rather than to estab-
lish the particular terms of judicial removal.37 The argument that the
Constitution establishes different standards for impeaching presidents
and judges is a relatively new one in the annals of impeachment his-
tory.3 For instance, President Johnson never made such a claim,
though his impeachment had been preceded by four judicial im-
peachments, including Associate Justice Samuel Chase's.
Another argument why the Constitution should be interpreted as
enacting a uniform standard derives from historical practices. The con-
stitutional language, "high Crimes and Misdemeanors, 31 is vague, indi-
Second Circuit Chief Judges Criticize Attacks on Judge Baer, 215 NY L J 4 (Mar 29,1996).
United States v Bayless, 921 F Supp 211 (S D NY 1996).
US Const Art II, § 4.
Similarly, the fact that the consequences that might ensue from an attempt to impeach a
president might be different from those that might result from the removal of a judge is not an
adequate basis for employing different constitutional standards for impeaching presidents and
judges. Rather, the consequences of an impeachment of an official could be factors to be taken
into account in the course of applying the common operative standard.
See Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process at 83-84 (cited in note 2).
See Published Impeachment Statement of Senator Paul Sarbanes, 145 Cong Rec S 1502-
04 (Feb 12,1999). Senator Sarbanes declared that
Judges must be held to a higher standard of conduct than other officials. As noted by the
House Judiciary Committee in 1970, Congress has recognized that Federal judges must be
held to a different standard of conduct than other civil officers because of the nature of
their position and the tenure of their office.
Id at 1503 (quoting House Judiciary Committee majority report accompanying recommended ar-
ticles of impeachment against Walter Nixon in 1989) (citation omitted in original).
US Const Art II, § 4.
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cating that the Founding Fathers wanted the body charged with ap-
plying this law, namely Congress, to interpret this phrase. And Con-
gress has never formally pronounced that judges and presidents are
subject to different impeachment standards. Of the seventeen senators
who expressed an opinion on this issue during Clinton's proceedings,
eleven (ten Republicans and one Democrat) asserted that the stan-
dard is uniform.40
C. Prosecuting a Sitting President
Yet another issue that arose in the Clinton impeachment pro-
ceedings involved whether a sitting president could be criminally in-
dicted or prosecuted (pp 105-09).41 On this question, Judge Posner
evaluates possible consequences and concludes that the likely practi-
cal effects weigh in favor of barring a sitting president from being
criminally indicted or prosecuted (p 106). The problem with his con-
clusion is that the main reason for immunizing a sitting president from
indictment or prosecution is the same as the best argument for having
a higher threshold for impeaching presidents than for judges-that the
proceeding would unduly paralyze the executive branch. Judge Posner
already gave a convincing response to this prospect-it is unlikely that
such an indictment or prosecution would be more debilitating than a
presidential impeachment trial, which did not paralyze the govern-
ment.
Judge Posner's other reason for concluding that a sitting presi-
dent should not be allowed to be criminally indicted or prosecuted is
the practical effect of a president's ability to pardon himself If the
president may pardon himself; then it becomes practically impossible
to ensure that a criminal indictment or prosecution of a president can
be accomplished (pp 107-09). The problem with this argument is that
Judge Posner fails to explore the significance of impeachment as a
check on a president pardoning himself. Abuse of power was the most
common example of an impeachable offense given in the constitu-
tional and ratifying conventions, and it is hard to imagine a better ex-
Senators who clearly supported different standards for impeaching presidents and judges
include Biden, 145 Cong Rec S 1477 (Feb 12,1999); Kerry, id at 1620; Kohl, id at 1547; Robb, id at
1510; and Sarbanes, id at 1503. Senators who clearly supported a uniform standard include Al-
lard, id at 1561; Bond, id at 1509; Brownback, id at 1608; Fitzgerald, id at 1520; Frist, id at 1528;
Gorton, id at 1463-64; Grams, id at 1500; Kyl, id at 1533; Mack, id at 1513; and McConnell, id at
1564.
" If so, then a president could possibly be vulnerable to impeachment on the basis of inca-
pacitation because of imprisonment or distraction from the need to defend himself If not, then
one of two disturbing prospects could arise-the specter of either a lawbreaking president stay-
ing in office awaiting later punishment or a Congress bent on expediting removal to facilitate the
president standing trial sooner rather than later.
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ample of such abuse than a president using his pardon power to avoid
criminal accountability for his misconduct. Indeed, it is an example
that several Framers and ratifiers used to illustrate the scope of the
42impeachment power.
IV. JUDGING CONGRESS
As the institution primarily responsible for competently and
fairly adjudicating President Clinton's impeachment, Congress failed
miserably, in Judge Posner's estimation. Posner criticizes Congress for
its partisan approach and its failure to adopt judicial procedures. Al-
though a completely non-partisan impeachment might be unattain-
able, Posner identifies structural changes that have made modem im-
peachments more vulnerable to partisan influences than the Founding
Fathers might have intended (p 118). For example, senators are now
directly elected by the voters of their respective states, and citizens
need no longer satisfy property requirements to vote (p 118). Mass
media, which immediately disseminates information throughout the
country, also has moved the country towards a more direct, populist
democracy (p 118).
The first problem with Posner's analysis of Congress's perform-
ance in the Clinton impeachment proceedings is that he dismisses all
too quickly the significance of the Founders' deliberate selection of
politicians, not judges, as the impeachment authorities, in part because
impeachment, as Posner concedes, involves balancing political inter-
ests.'3 Moreover, the vagueness of the impeachment standard invites
the infusion of politics into an impeachment trial," for a vague stan-
dard confers greater discretion to the adjudicator.
See, for example, Max Farrand, ed, 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 550
(Yale 1966) (statement of Colonel Mason); Jonathan Elliot, ed, 3 The Debates in the Several State
Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 498 (Taylor & Maury 2d ed 1854)
(statement of James Madison during the Virginia ratifying convention). See also An Impartial
Citizen V, in John P. Kaminski and Gaspare J. Saladino, eds, 8 The Documentary History of the
Ratification of the Constitution: Ratification of the Constitution by the States: Virginia 428,429-30
(State Historical Soc of Wis 1988), which declared that
[S]hould the President pardon in common cases before conviction, or afterwards forgive no-
torious villains, or persons who should be unfit objects of mercy, this would be such a mis-
feasance of his office, as would subject himself to be personally impeached. He is as respon-
sible for transactions in one part of his office as another.
Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process at xi (cited in note 2).
The fact that bipartisanship was not achieved in President Clinton's trial was not surpris-
ing. It had one significant variable that the seven cases in which the Senate has convicted and
removed officials did not-a popularly elected president (who was still popular during his im-
peachment). It also lacked most variables present in those cases, including a clearly severe injury
to the constitutional order, a clear link between the offense alleged to that injury and an official's
formal duties, and a showing that the linkage among the injury, alleged offense, and duties was so
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The Constitution diffuses the harms of partisanship by mandating
a supermajority requirement for conviction by the Senate. Convincing
more than two-thirds of the Senate to remove an official (particularly
a president) requires a showing of misconduct that is so bad and so
clearly linked to the public responsibilities of the impeached official
(even the exemplary moral duties of the official) that the normal pull
of partisanship is overcome. That the Constitution demands such a
showing is not a new insight 5
Moreover, Posner's criticisms of the procedures employed in
Clinton's trial, including his judgment of the trial as "a travesty of le-
gal justice" (p 127), are problematic. Posner argues that Congress
erred by failing to adopt a standard of proof, rules of evidence, or a
gag rule (pp 120-128). As a self-described pragmatist, Posner surpris-
ingly overlooks practical difficulties in implementing uniform proce-
dural rules. While a gag rule might be enforceable, senators probably
would not be comfortable enforcing other recommended rules, such as
one that mandates a particular burden of proof Each chamber has
long followed a tradition that respects each member's ability to decide
various procedural issues, such as the proper burden of proof, for him
or herselC6
Nor, as Posner contends, were the members of Congress involved
with Clinton's impeachment out of their depth. To begin with, most
participated in the three judicial impeachment proceedings in the
1980s.47 A significant minority participated in Congress' investigations
of Richard Nixon's misconduct.4 Their decisions were calculated risks
close that the official was left unable to perform his duties, Those are a lot of missing variables,
enough to explain an acquittal, without having to conclude that the system is broken.
The Founding Fathers were well aware of the potential for impeachments to become po-
litical. See, for example, Federalist 65 (Hamilton), in Isaac Kramnick, ed, The Federalist Papers
380,380-81 (Penguin 1987). Hence, the supermajority requirement exists in part to prevent parti-
sanship from being the sole or primary reason for removing a high-ranking official. The odds are
that to get a supermajority to convict there must be some members of the official's party who
cross over. In the absence of such a crossover, the odds favor acquittal.
In fact, the Clinton impeachment proceedings essentially reaffirmed the practical implica-
tions of Nixon v United States, 506 US 224 (1993), which held that constitutional challenges to
impeachment trial procedures are nonjusticiable. Consequently, it is left to the nonreviewable
discretion of the House and the Senate to devise their respective impeachment procedures as
they each see fit. See Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process at 118-46 (cited in note 2).
Of the representatives who participated in the House impeachment proceedings in the
1980s, over one-hundred forty participated in President Clinton's House proceedings and at least
seventeen in his impeachment trial. At least fifty-one senators who participated in President
Clinton's trial participated in the impeachment trials of Alcee Hastings and Walter Nixon.
Sixty-seven representatives who voted on President Clinton's impeachment served in the
House during its investigation of President Nixon's misconduct, and seven members of the
House Judiciary Committee that approved impeachment articles against President Nixon par-
ticipated in either the House or Senate impeachment proceedings against President Clinton.
Eleven senators who participated in the Senate's investigation of President Nixon's misconduct
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that in fact might have paid off for those primarily interested in tar-
nishing the President's legacy or facilitating the election of a Republi-
can as President in 2000 (by nurturing or encouraging Clinton fa-
tigue).
Moreover, there is no empirical support for Posner's claim that
House members lack the requisite training or resources to undertake
independent fact-finding in an impeachment inquiry. The fact that in
thirteen of the sixteen impeachment hearings conducted by the House
its members did undertake some independent fact-finding (even in
five of the eight matters referred to the House by external authorities)
indicates that they do have the requisite training and resources to un-
49dertake some fact-finding. Indeed, such undertakings have proven es-
sential for cultivating public confidence in the House's judgments to
impeach as non-partisan.
V. JUDGING ACADEMICIANS
Posner's critique of public intellectuals who come from "soft
subjects" or fields (such as law, history, and philosophy) that lack con-
sensus-building methodologies (pp 230-40) is problematic for several
reasons.
First, the critique is disproportionately skewed against liberals.
Granted, there is ample empirical data demonstrating the liberal bias
of academicians, particularly law professors, 0 a numerical advantage
that enabled liberals to dominate academic debates on impeachment.
More than four hundred law professors and four hundred historians
submitted letters urging the House Judiciary Committee to forego its
participated in the Clinton trial. At least two members of Congress who participated in the
Clinton proceedings (Zoe Lofgren in the House and Fred Thompson in the Senate) served as
staffers in Congress's investigations of President Nixon's misconduct.
The only three instances in which the House refused to undertake any fact-finding in an
impeachment inquiry were the proceedings for Harry Claiborne, Andrew Johnson, and Bill
Clinton. Claiborne encouraged the House to forego fact-finding in the (ultimately futile) hope
that a full Senate trial would vindicate him, while the House's failures to undertake some inde-
pendent fact-finding in the other two cases-both involving presidents-came back to haunt the
House (by making it look intemperate) in the ensuing Senate impeachment trials.See Deborah Jones Merritt, Research and Teaching on Law Faculties: An Empirical Explo-
ration, 73 Chi Kent L Rev 765,780 n 54 (1998) (indicating that only 10 percent of law professors
identify themselves as conservative); James Lindgren, Measuring Diversity, Speech to the Na-
tional Association of Scholars (Jan 5, 1997) (reporting that more than 80 percent of law profes-
sors are registered Democrats); Seymour Martin Lipset, The Sources of Political Correctness on
American Campuses, in Howard Dickman, ed, The Imperiled Academy 71,79 (Transaction 1993)
(referring to the results of a 1989 survey by the Carnegie Corporation, finding that at research
universities, 67 percent of professors identify themselves as liberal while only 17 percent identify
themselves as conservative); Richard Pipes, Property and Freedom 272 (Knopf 1999) (reporting
that in the humanities and social sciences, less than 4 percent of faculty identify themselves as
conservative).
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impeachment inquiry against Clinton;5 ' the conservative counterpart
was a letter signed by ninety-six academics and former government
officials, suggesting that the Starr Report could support a case for re-
moving Clinton."
Yet the obvious prominence of liberal voices in the impeachment
debate does not explain Posner's selection of academics to single out
by name. He provides severe and detailed criticism of numerous lib-
eral academics, including Schlesinger, Nagel, Sandel, Mikva, Dworkin,
Sovern, Rakove, and Wilentz (pp 208-09,231-37), but he fails to iden-
tify any particular error committed by a conservative legal scholar. As
Michael Klarman and Neal Devins have shown, however, the im-
peachment debate brought out the worst in both liberal and conserva-
tive law professors.53 Moreover, there was a striking absence of any
moderate voices in the impeachment debate-demonstrated at least
in part by the fact that the author of this Review was the only joint
witness in a hearing at which eighteen other legal scholars testified as
experts about whether the President's misconduct was impeachable.
Another illustration of Judge Posner's unbalanced critique of
academic impeachment commentary is that the institution of which he
is least critical is the media, whose coverage he commends as largely
exemplary (pp 246-48)." Yet one recent empirical study of the media's
coverage of the proceedings indicates it had a pro-prosecution bias.5
Moreover, this bias probably overwhelmed the effects of the liberal
academy's bias. For it appears as if the media's bias turned off most of
the public relatively early in the proceedings.-6 Consequently, it is
doubtful that liberal commentary even had much effect on public
opinion regarding the proceedings. The odds are that for the most part
it fell on deaf ears.
" See Background and History of Impeachment, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the
Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong, 2d'Sess 334-39, 374-83
(GPO 1998) (historian and law professor letters, respectively).
See Don't Let the President Lie with Impunity, Wall St J A22 (Dec 10,1998).
Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fetishism and the Clinton Impeachment Debate, 85 Va L
Rev 631 (1999); Neal Devins, Bearing False Witness: The Clinton Impeachment and the Future of
Academic Freedom, 148 U Pa L Rev 165 (2000).
According to Judge Posner, the media's
one big mistake ... was to describe Lewinsky as a twenty-one-year-old intern, which created
the impression that Clinton had taken advantage of a girl. Lewinsky was twenty-two when
the affair began and only nominally an intern, since she had been hired as a regular em-
ployee, though the paperwork for the appointment had not been completed. And she was a
savvy, sexually experienced young woman, not a vulnerable naiL
(p 248).
See Kovach and Rosenstiel, Warp Speed at 63-64,77-78,104 (cited in note 2).
Id at 63,77-78.
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Another problem with Posner's critique of public intellectuals is
his failure to adopt a standard for evaluating the quality of academic
commentary on public events. He summarily concludes that academics
cannot guide our country with disinterested analysis (p 12), without
considering whether the norms of public intellectuals could evolve to
minimize, if not eliminate, partisan propaganda masquerading as in-
tellectual reasoning. For example, public intellectuals could adopt
something like the code that governs judicial ethics.' Such a standard
would require academics to disclose any potential conflict of interest,
such as close ties to any of the parties involved in the story or event,-
so that the public can better interpret their commentary. Similarly,
academic commentators should specify their domains of expertise.
Posner justifiably chastises those vho assumed a mantle of authority
as law professors in signing an anti-impeachment letter, ' without be-
ing expert in impeachment law or the facts of Clinton's case (p 242).
VI. JUDGING POSNER
One possibly serious consequence missed by Judge Posner is the
impact of his commentary on his judicial status. Judge Posner appro-
priately considers whether his judicial obligations preclude his com-
menting on any of Clinton's legal or impeachment troubles, but he
quickly dismisses the likelihood of any impropriety. He acknowledges
the judicial canon "forbid[ding] public comment on any pending
cases" (p 3),0 but hastens to add, "I do not comment on any pending
cases" (p 3).
It is, however, possible that the Judge construes the canon re-
stricting commentary on pending cases too narrowly; presumably, he
has construed it as restricting him from commenting only on a case
pending before his court or himself. It could also reasonably be con-
The idea that law professors are like judges in certain respects is not new. For a classic
statement of the similarity between judges and law professors, see Alexander Bickel, The Least
Dangerous Branch 25-26 (Yale 2d ed 1986) ("Judges have, or should have, the leisure, the train-
ing, and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of government.").
For further analysis of the standard that should govern lawyers commenting on public events, see
Erwin Chemerinsky and Laurie Levenson, The Ethics of Being a Commentator, 69 S Cal L Rev
1303 (1996); Erwin Chemerinsky and Laurie Levenson, The Ethics of Being a Commentator II,
37 Santa Clara L Rev 913 (1997).
This includes, inter alia, disclosing one's basic political or ideological biases or inclinations.
See, for example, Louis M. Seidman and Mark V. Tushnet, Remnants of Belief (Oxford 1996) (in-
cluding a "bibliographic essay" that identifies the books and articles that particularly influenced
the authors).
See Background and History of Impeachment at 374-83 (cited in note 51) (law professor
letter).The canon in question is Canon 3 of the ABA's Model Code of Judicial Conduct. See
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (1997).
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strued as restricting his commenting on cases pending in other courts.6 1
In fact, he recognizes that several matters on which he comments ex-
tensively are pending in other legal fora. For example, he acknowl-
edges the Justice Department's ongoing investigation into whether the
Independent Counsel violated any ethical or legal obligations (p 7 n
14); and he recognizes that the President has not yet been but could
still be prosecuted for various criminal infractions (pp 7 n 14, 162,
166). Moreover, Judge Posner acknowledges that the President could
be disbarred for having committed certain crimes (p 55) and that
Clinton "could be disciplined by the district judge or by the Arkansas
bar" (p 4 n 10).
It is easy to imagine that Judge Posner's comments might influ-
ence some of these pending matters. For example, it is possible that
any federal court before which the Independent Counsel ever tries to
defend the legality of his office's tactics could cite Judge Posner's con-
clusion that any wrongs done by the Independent Counsel were "in-
consequential" (p 74). It is also possible that if the President ever were
to face disbarment, someone might introduce the Judge's book into
the record as reflecting one prominent federal judge's views on the
President's fitness to remain a member of the bar. I can further imag-
ine that his book-including its suggestion that it would be better for
the nation if the President were not prosecuted for his criminal acts to
preclude having the prosecution become a major issue in the next
presidential election (p 194)-will make the rounds of the independ-
ent counsel's office, which has not yet firmly decided to forego prose-
cuting the President or the First Lady. Nor has Starr's office published
its final report, which, for all we know, could draw heavily (at least for
inspiration or moral support) from Posner's expansive speculation on
the array of criminal acts that he believes the President committed
"clear[ly] beyond a reasonable doubt" (p 54). How much easier to
convict the President in a report than in. a real courtroom with a real
judge and jury, especially when a leading federal judge has given his
blessing to such an assessment.
I hasten to add that though Judge Posner's expansive commen-
taries are hard to reconcile with his technical responsibilities as a
judge, any conflicts are by no means impeachable. If the Clinton im-
peachment proceedings demonstrated nothing else, they showed that
11 See, for example, In re Broadbelt, 146 NJ 501, 683 A2d 543 (1996) (holding unanimously
that a municipal court judge had violated Canon 3 by providing television commentary on
pending cases in other courts, including courts outside New Jersey).
. Posner also speculates that Judge Wright "could have imposed monetary sanctions on
Clinton under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which creates sanctions for bad
faith in pretrial discovery" (p 55).
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removal is not an appropriate remedy for every indiscretion, mistaken
judgment, or arguable breach of trust. Other fora exist for addressing
such errors, including public opinion, the judgment of history, and civil
or criminal proceedings. Posner's indiscretions merit at most some
public criticism (and perhaps the scorn of some colleagues), but they
do not come remotely close to constituting the serious abuse of power
or constitutional injury that justifies removal.
Ironically, Judge Posner explains that he wrote his book in the
midst of the President's trial to avoid "hindsight bias" (p 4).?6 How-
ever, the Judge could have written his manuscript during the trial but
published the book a few years later when the entire affair had sub-
sided or concluded. This would have avoided hindsight bias and any
virtually contemporaneous negative impact his commentary may have
on himself as a symbol of law.
CONCLUSION
Judge Posner's newest book has all of the strengths of his other
work-it is impressively multidisciplinary, lucidly written, and illumi-
nates a topic one would have thought had already been overanalyzed.
His recognition of the challenges posed by the vagueness of the con-
stitutional standard of impeachment is exemplary. He recognizes that
this vagueness compels members of Congress to balance many factors,
including an official's formal duties, the gravity of an offense, the in-
jury that the misconduct has caused the constitutional order, the link
between an official's misconduct and duties, the degree to which the
misconduct has disabled an official from doing his or her job, and
other possible avenues for redress. He further recognizes public opin-
ion is a factor, both to the extent it has to be considered in calculating
other factors and in its own right.
Yet, the fallout Judge Posner perceives as arising from Bill
Clinton's impeachment is not so dire as he suggests. The members of
the Supreme Court cannot fairly be held accountable for all of the
fallout from Morrison and Jones, because there were other significant
intervening forces, including Judge Wright's lax control of discovery
and the President's surprising failures to testify truthfully under oath
in civil and criminal proceedings. Congress was also well within its
rights, taking calculated risks for which its members remain politically
Hindsight bias is a "serious problem in historiography" (p 4) in which a historian analyz-
ing an event that has been "declared 'closed' (p 4) imposes on it a design or framework that it
did not have at the time of its occurrence. Ironically, "hindsight bias" is a risk that judges rou-
tinely undertake. It is commonly thought that one important measure of the legitimacy of a
judge's ruling is that it has not been made in the heat of the moment but rather from a dispas-
sionate perspective that is removed in time and space from the controversy being reviewed.
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accountable. Moreover, the presidency is probably stronger, because
subsequent congresses will likely recognize a zone of private miscon-
duct for which presidents will not be held accountable in the im-
peachment process. In addition, Posner does not posit a standard by
which to measure the quality of academic commentary on Clinton's
impeachment and legal troubles. Nor, for that matter, does Posner as-
sess more fully (as his methodology requires) the problems that his
expansive commentaries on unsettled legal and political matters pose
for his own status as a symbol of the law's neutrality. His comments
are at odds with the expectation that as a symbol of the law's neutral-
ity he will refrain from trying to influence ongoing legal proceedings
or become involved in an ongoing political fray.
Ironically, the President's acquittal points to a lesson that is as
important to future presidents as it is for Judge Posner. The
President's acquittal is a strong reminder that impeachment is not a
mechanism for redressing every indiscretion or mistake of judgment
made by an impeachable official. Impeachable officials (even one as
extraordinarily talented as Richard Posner) sometimes make mistakes
that subject them to public criticism and perhaps a rebuke from some
of their colleagues or successors. That's a form of justice, though it is
not the kind of justice that Richard Posner dispenses. But it is a form
of justice that is real and enduring. Just ask Bill Clinton.
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